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The electoral consequences of the change in federal grant spending per capita. These six models replicate the results from Tables 1-4 in the manuscript using the change in per capita grant spending in a county as the independent variable of interest, instead of the percentage change in grant spending in the county. The results are substantively identical to those presented in the manuscript. Increased per capita grant spending in a county boosts the incumbent party's prospects in the next presidential election, particularly in counties from competitive states and in counties that are represented in Congress by members of the president's party. Also consistent with theory, the relationship is significantly stronger in liberal and moderate counties than in conservative counties. Influence of the percent change in grant spending on the incumbent administration party's vote share. Instead of analyzing the effect of grant spending on the change in the incumbent administration party's vote share, these models replicate the results for Tables 1-4 by using the party's actual vote share as the dependent variable and by including it's vote share in the preceding election as an independent variable. The results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript across specifications. 5 4
The electoral consequences of percent change in grant spending, without county fixed effects. These models employ identical specifications to those used to produce Tables 1-4, except that they do not include county fixed effects. All of the results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5
The electoral consequences of percent change in grant spending, with state fixed effects. These models employ identical specifications to those used to produce Tables 1-4, except that they employ state fixed effects instead of county fixed effects. All of the results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript. . . . . . . . . 7 6
How partisan accountability mediates the influence of federal grant spending. This model replicates The electoral consequences of increases and decreases in federal grant spending. These models replicate the results from Table 1 in the manuscript, but disaggregate the percentage change in grants measure into increases and decreases. Voters reward the incumbent president for increases in grant spending and punish him for decreases. 10 9
Individual-level analysis of the influence of district grant spending on vote choice, excluding state fixed effects. These models replicate those presented in Robust standard errors clustered on county in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 Table 1 : The electoral consequences of the change in federal grant spending per capita. These six models replicate the results from Tables 1-4 in the manuscript using the change in per capita grant spending in a county as the independent variable of interest, instead of the percentage change in grant spending in the county. The results are substantively identical to those presented in the manuscript. Increased per capita grant spending in a county boosts the incumbent party's prospects in the next presidential election, particularly in counties from competitive states and in counties that are represented in Congress by members of the president's party. Also consistent with theory, the relationship is significantly stronger in liberal and moderate counties than in conservative counties. Table 3 : Influence of the percent change in grant spending on the incumbent administration party's vote share. Instead of analyzing the effect of grant spending on the change in the incumbent administration party's vote share, these models replicate the results for Tables 1-4 by using the party's actual vote share as the dependent variable and by including it's vote share in the preceding election as an independent variable. The results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript across specifications. Table 4 : The electoral consequences of percent change in grant spending, without county fixed effects. These models employ identical specifications to those used to produce Tables 1-4, except that they do not include county fixed effects. All of the results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript. Observations 2, 074 2, 074 2, 074 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 Table 9 : Individual-level analysis of the influence of district grant spending on vote choice, excluding state fixed effects. These models replicate those presented in Table 5 , but exclude state fixed effects. All results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript.
(1)
(2) Observations 2, 402 2, 402 2, 402 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 Table 10 : Individual-level analysis of the influence of district grant spending on vote choice, excluding likely voter weights. These models replicate those presented in Table 5 , but they do not employ Gallup's likely voter weights. All results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript.
